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Abstract  
We present a modified open monocentric city model that assumes that land is available for 
conversion into new housing throughout the city. The model predicts that positive local income 
shocks (i) increase the city’s share of multi-family housing in new construction and (ii) lead to 
the construction of smaller units. We exploit the metro area samples of the American Housing 
Survey from 1984 to 2004 and find support for both predictions. We confirm that the 
adjustment process is driven by migration and is hindered by strict local land use control. Our 
findings imply that tight regulation may hamper metro area level labor market adjustment to 
positive economic shocks not only through limits on the quantity of newly supplied units but 
also by constraining their type to single-family houses and larger units that may be less suitable 
for would-be-migrants. 
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1 Introduction 
The composition of the existing housing stock in a city does not only determine the character 
of a city – its skyline – but affects a host of important attributes such as the city’s household 
composition, its homeownership propensity, or its population density and hence, conceivably, 
productivity. As a consequence of the durability of housing, if the nature of the existing 
housing stock is important for a location’s fortunes, then so should be the nature of new 
housing supply. Housing units built in a certain period – reflecting the demand and supply 
conditions at that point in time – last for several decades and sometimes centuries, continuing 
to exert positive and negative externalities associated with their characteristics.  
Little is known to date about the determinants of the characteristics of new housing supply. In 
particular, little is known about how local economic shocks affect the nature of the newly 
built housing stock. In this paper we explore empirically how local economic conditions, at 
the time when new housing developments are being planned and built, affect the composition 
of new housing supply, i.e., whether new housing is of single-family or multi-family type and 
the size of newly built housing units in square feet.  
To guide our empirical analysis, we first derive predictions from a modified version of the 
open monocentric city model that assumes that some land – either already developed or still 
undeveloped – is available for conversion into new housing throughout the city. Unlike the 
standard open monocentric city model that implicitly assumes that the city is rebuilt from 
scratch in each period, our implicit assumptions are that (i) the building stock is durable and 
depreciates slowly and at some point can become obsolete and is replaced and (ii) during the 
outward development process of a city, some pockets of land may remain undeveloped
1
 but 
are subject to infill at a later stage. Formally we assume that some (re)development takes 
place all over the urban area and that the share of land that is converted into new housing may 
vary between more central and more peripheral locations, consistent with stylized facts 
derived from the American Housing Survey (AHS) and empirical evidence presented by e.g. 
Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009), Burchfield et al. (2006), or McDonald and McMillen 
(2000). We also assume that conversion rates depend on local income levels, capturing the 
idea that the opportunity cost of keeping land open or of not redeveloping existing defunct 
property stock increases with local income. Given these assumptions, our model predicts that 
positive local income shocks (i) increase the share of multi-family housing in the city and (ii) 
cause the construction of smaller units.  
The economic intuition for these predictions is, at a first glance at least, not straightforward: 
Housing is a normal good and hence one might expect that local economic booms induce the 
construction of more single-family units and of more large units, whereas local economic 
                                                 
1
 In practice there are numerous reasons for why land is not uniformly developed at each distance to the center. 
For example, undeveloped land varies in soil quality and topography and consequently in the development cost. 
Also, heterogeneous owners of undeveloped land may differ in their reservation price, at which they are willing 
to develop their land. Undeveloped land also has a real option value and the valuation of this option may too 
vary across heterogeneous owners. Certain sites may be off limits to developers because of zoning or other types 
of government intervention. Finally, certain undeveloped sites (in between developed ones) may be awkward 
and costly to develop because of their unusual shapes so not viable at the time of general outward development. 
But these sites may become viable for development at a later stage because of increased demand pressures. 
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crises might have the opposite effect. However, this view ignores the important insight that 
residents can relocate across cities and that such relocation may equalize differences in living 
standards across cities. In a setting with an open monocentric city, where households can 
relocate freely between cities and housing is assumed to be perfectly malleable, a positive 
city-level income shock temporarily increases the utility of its residents compared to the 
utility of the outside option. This attracts more migrants into the city and thereby increases 
land and house prices and reduces the quantity of housing consumed at each distance from 
the Central Business District (CBD). In the new spatial equilibrium, household migration 
exactly equalizes the utility of households across cities. 
The higher land prices also invoke a substitution away from land to capital in the housing 
production process, implying more capital-intensive housing in spatial equilibrium, again, at 
each distance from the CBD. But this does not necessarily imply that in the metro area as a 
whole the capital intensity of new construction must increase. This is because a positive 
income shock also generates more new housing development with low capital intensity at the 
urban fringe. Hence, the aggregate effect is a priori ambiguous. One contribution of our 
theoretical analysis is that we derive the predictions that a positive income shock increases the 
share of construction of multi-family housing and leads to the construction of smaller units at 
the aggregate metro area level.  
In order to test our model predictions we turn to the AHS. We gather information on over 
700,000 housing units, including their year of construction, from all AHS Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA)-samples between 1984 and 2004. A key assumption in our empirical 
strategy is that after a unit is built, the type (single-family vs. multi-family) and the size of the 
unit (floor area in square feet) remain unchanged for a few years. In our baseline specification 
we assume that the fraction of units that increase their floor size within the first ten years after 
construction is small. (In a robustness check we narrow down this time window to five years.) 
Building on this plausible assumption, measures of the type and size of new housing supply 
can be created for each MSA by taking means conditional on the year of construction. These 
measures are subsequently related to one-year lagged MSA-level income per capita and 
construction industry-wages in a fixed effects panel data analysis that fully controls for time-
invariant heterogeneity and trends at the national level. Ultimately, we end up with a panel 
dataset consisting of 47 MSAs and nearly 2000 observations. 
Our fixed effects baseline estimates provide strong support for the two model predictions that 
positive local income shocks are associated with the construction of more multi-family 
housing and smaller units. To illustrate the magnitude of the effects, consider the case where 
income is constant everywhere in the country except in one metro area. (Alternatively we 
could assume that income grows more strongly in the focal metro area than nationally without 
loss of generality.) This metro area receives a one-time productivity shock that raises local 
income by 10 percent from year  -1 to year  . From year   onwards income remains again 
unchanged. Our baseline result implies that such a shock permanently raises the share of 
multi-family units in new construction by 6.4 percentage points from period   onwards.  
To put this into context, say a city consists of 1 million housing units, 30 percent of which are 
of the multi-family type prior to the shock. Say 40,000 new units are being built each year, 
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either replacing existing run-down housing stock, converting brownfield land, or being built 
on open land. This implies that prior to the shock 12,000 new multi-family units (30 percent 
of 40,000) are built each year. Holding the total number of new units constant, our estimates 
imply that the positive income shock will induce a permanent increase in construction of 
multi-family units from 12,000 to 14,560 (= (0.3+0.064)   40,000) in each subsequent period. 
A one-time positive income shock of 10 percent will thus after 10 years generate an additional 
25,600 (10 times 2,560) multi-family units and correspondingly fewer single-family units.
2
 
Although this illustrative example suggests that our estimated effects are not very large, since 
the effects are permanent in nature and cumulative over time, they are quantitatively 
meaningful in the long-run. Moreover, our derived quantitative effects are consistent with the 
observation that the built housing stock in a city typically only changes gradually and slowly 
due to the extreme durability and thus slow depreciation of housing. Similarly, our other base 
line results are meaningful and plausible. A one-time 10 percent increase in local income, 
holding national level income constant, reduces the square footage of an average single-
family house by 119 square feet (4.8 percent) and that of an average multi-family unit by 350 
square feet (16.8) percent. 
Our theoretical model implies that our findings are driven by migration across cities in 
response to local income shocks. Using a Bartik (1991)-type identification strategy, we indeed 
find supporting evidence that migration in response to changing local economic conditions 
(i.e., local labor demand shocks) is the underlying force driving our findings. Put differently, 
our instrumental variable estimates are indicative that local labor demand shocks, via 
inducing migration, cause changes in the composition of new housing supply. 
Our theoretical setting implicitly assumes that the nature of new housing supply in a city is 
purely driven by market forces. In many American cities and, in fact, in many cities across the 
world, however, new housing supply is in crucial ways determined by regulatory constraints 
on land use and building construction. That is, land use regulation may well drive a wedge 
between the new housing supplied in a city and the counterfactual outcome of a setting where 
new construction is purely determined by market forces. Empirically, we indeed find that the 
adjustment processes are confined to MSAs with comparably lax land use regulation. Our 
findings imply that severe land use controls may hamper MSA-level labor market adjustment 
not only through limits on the quantity of newly supplied housing units (Glaeser et al., 2006; 
Saks, 2008), but also by constraining their type to single-family houses and larger units that 
are less suitable for would-be-migrants. 
Our paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, we shed light on the link 
between local economic conditions and the nature of new housing supply. Second, we 
propose a modified version of the open monocentric city model that explicitly distinguishes 
between multi-family and single-family units and reconciles the theoretical framework with 
observed regularities with respect to new residential development. Third, we explore the role 
of land use regulation in this context and reveal that our findings are confined to metro areas 
                                                 
2
 This back of the envelope calculation assumes that the income differential does not converge. Blanchard and 
Katz (1992) however document a tendency for regional income differentials to converge. To the extent that there 
is convergence over time, the effect will get smaller over time and the aggregate effect will be less pronounced. 
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with lax land use controls, suggesting a mismatch between the newly constructed housing 
stock and the preferences of would-be-migrants.  
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the related literature. 
Section 3 provides a theoretical framework that guides our empirical analysis. Section 4 
describes the data and empirical strategy in more detail. In Section 5 we present results. 
Conclusions are offered in the final section. 
2 Background and related literature 
Our theoretical framework builds upon the seminal work on the monocentric city model 
(MCM) by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967, 1972), and Muth (1969), and, in particular on the 
Muth model that incorporates housing construction (see e.g. Brueckner, 1987; Fujita, 1989). 
One limitation of the standard MCM is the extreme assumption that the conversion rate of the 
existing housing stock into new housing stock is 1 throughout the city – housing capital is 
assumed to be perfectly malleable. Put differently: the city is rebuilt from scratch in every 
single period. The reverse extreme assumption is perfectly durable housing capital. In such a 
setting new construction of (single-family) housing can only take place within small 
concentric rings at the edge of the city, where agricultural land is converted into housing. 
Neither extreme squares well with empirical evidence. The American Housing Survey (AHS) 
– the data source underlying our empirical analysis – reveals that housing construction takes 
place all over metropolitan areas. The rate of new construction relative to the existing housing 
stock is only about twice as high in the suburbs as in the city center. In a similar vein, 
Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) document the percentage of housing stock in 2000 that is 
under 10 years old as a function of distance to the city center. While they find that newer 
housing is disproportionately located in suburban areas, they also document that except for 
the largest cities, the percentage hardly varies between 10 and 40 miles from the city center. 
New residential construction is not confined to greenfield or brownfield sites but also occurs 
to replace older housing, typically at higher density. Such conversion takes place especially in 
older parts of cities, in or close to the center (Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009). In these areas 
there is often also a considerable amount of brownfield development as locations used 
previously by manufacturing or other industries that left the city are converted into housing. 
Appendix Figure A1 (in Appendix A) illustrates, for the case of New York City in 2012, the 
stylized fact that local residential development takes place throughout the city.
3
 
Both, the standard MCM and models with perfect durability ignore the important fact that the 
housing stock is durable but depreciates (see e.g., Brueckner, 2000). In models with durability 
and depreciation the possibility that multi-family and single-family housing are not strictly 
separated in different concentric zones, as is the case when housing capital is malleable, arises 
naturally. Upward sloping and even discontinuous building height contours can result. 
Moreover, in the face of uncertainty, urban development does not necessarily occur from the 
                                                 
3
 The map is derived from the NYC Department of City Planning’s publicly available MapPLUTO data set. This 
includes both residential units and year built for every parcel in New York City. The data can be accessed via: 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bytes/dwn_pluto_mappluto.shtml#mappluto (last accessed: July 22, 2014). 
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city center outwards. Instead there may be leapfrog development, in which some land within 
the city boundary remains vacant (Capozza and Helsley, 1990).
4
  
The theoretical prediction of leapfrogging is consistent with an important stylized fact: 
pockets of land are open and developable within most US cities. Remote-sensing information 
on land use dynamics points to the importance of infill: Burchfield et al. (2006) document that 
scattered and incomplete residential development is the rule rather than the exception. 
Suburban developments tend to leave substantial amounts of space open, which may become 
an important source of new construction within the urban fringe at a later stage. They also 
provide evidence that areas that were about half developed in 1976 were subject to the most 
intense residential development between 1976 and 1992. In a similar vein, McDonald and 
McMillen (2000) examine the location of residential and commercial real estate development 
in the Chicago metro area between 1990 and 1996. Their findings indicate, among other 
things, that new residential development did not just take place at the edge of the Chicago 
metro area but took place throughout the metro area, forming clusters of their own between 
major highways. 
In our model we attempt to reconcile the open monocentric city framework with the stylized 
facts that (i) housing is durable but depreciates and is ultimately redeveloped and (ii) there are 
pockets of open land even close to the city center and these pockets often are developed at a 
later stage. Specifically, we assume that some fraction,  , of all land (developed or 
undeveloped) is redeveloped or newly developed, respectively, in each period. We assume 
that this fraction depends on the local income in the city (relative to the national average) and 
we allow it to differ between the core and the periphery of the city.  
Our paper also relates to the housing supply literature. This literature has either focused on 
new housing supply in units or on the “volume” of residential investment at the national level, 
thus aggregating all composition and quality aspects into one single variable and ignoring the 
spatial dimension (e.g., DiPasquale, 1999). Studies in the former category generally focus on 
the single-family sector, thus ignoring the supply of multi-family housing. Heterogeneity 
within the single-family-sector is ignored as well, even though the hedonic literature suggests 
that the value of single-family housing units varies widely depending on their attributes.  
At the metro area level, in a cross-section and in the absence of strict land use controls 
(zoning), the housing stock composition can be expected to be mainly determined by the 
strength of agglomeration and dispersion forces; larger and denser cities with stronger 
agglomeration forces should have more high-rise (multi-family) buildings in the center and a 
steeper residential land price gradient. A growing body of the literature, however, highlights 
the significant impact that land use regulations exert on housing supply, at least in some metro 
areas. For example, in US metro areas where regulation is more stringent, residential 
construction in units is less responsive to price changes (Green et al., 2005; Quigley and 
Raphael, 2005) and shifts in labor demand translate into higher wages and house prices, rather 
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 An alternative explanation for leapfrogging is that people have a preference for housing that is close to open 
space (Turner, 2005). See also Burchfield et al. (2006) for a summary of the related theoretical literature.  
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than into more jobs and houses (Glaeser et al., 2006; Saks, 2008).
5
 Hilber and Turner (2014) 
explore the role that land use constraints exert on homeownership attainment. They 
demonstrate that the US mortgage interest deduction boosts homeownership attainment of 
higher income households in less tightly regulated housing markets but that in restrictive 
places an adverse effect exists. 
Tight land use regulation likely also influences the housing stock composition in important 
ways.  Strict height controls for example prevent high-rise buildings. Historic preservation 
prevents redevelopment at higher density. Zoning determines how much multi-family or 
single-family housing can be built. Other types of controls (e.g., minimum lot size 
restrictions) directly affect the size of the housing units (and thereby the population density 
and the household composition). The overall effect of restrictive land use regulation may well 
be that it drives a wedge between the existing housing stock and newly constructed housing 
on the one hand and the housing that is desired by migrants on the other. We explore this 
proposition in the theoretical and empirical analyses that follow.  
Another strand of the urban economics literature considers the link between the housing stock 
(supply) and the corresponding household composition. Affluent households in the United 
States tend to sort into communities that predominately consist of spacious and expensive 
single-family homes. As a consequence, such communities have higher local property tax 
income per capita and therefore can offer better local public schools and other local public 
services. In contrast, low income households prefer to sort into inexpensive lower “quality” 
housing in decaying areas (Rosenthal, 2008)
6
 or into areas where government programs have 
contributed to “affordable housing” (Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009). Minimum lot size 
restrictions, imposed by affluent households in order to keep less well-off households at bay, 
tend to reinforce such sorting by income based on the underlying built environment. 
Our study also ties into the literature on the determinants and economic consequences of 
homeownership. Particularly relevant to our investigation, a few studies have pointed out that 
multi-family units are significantly more likely to be renter-occupied
7
 (Coulson and Fisher, 
2014; Hilber, 2005 and 2014; Linneman, 1985). Hilber (2005 and 2014) provide empirical 
evidence for the United States and Europe, respectively. Coulson and Fisher (2014) and 
Linneman (1985) provide theoretical explanations.  
To the extent that the construction of more multi-family housing causes a decrease in the 
homeownership propensity, our study has direct relevance for the voluminous literature on the 
social and economic consequences of homeownership. The literature suggests that 
homeownership is linked to (i) housing maintenance (e.g., Galster, 1983), (ii) investment in 
local public goods such as public schools (e.g., Hilber and Mayer, 2009), (iii) investment in  
social capital (e.g., DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber, 2010; Hoff and Sen, 2005), (iv) 
                                                 
5
 See Duranton and Puga (2014) for a discussion of the wider implications of land use regulation on urban 
economic growth. 
6
 Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) show that the same mechanism is at play at the geographical level of MSAs. In 
declining cities where labor demand is weak, house prices are low but through decay, the housing stock adjusts 
only slowly to these conditions. This leads to a sorting process in which people with lower human capital levels 
stay in declining cities in order to benefit from relatively cheap housing.  
7
 According to the national American Housing Survey (AHS), only about one in seven multi-family units in the 
US are owner-occupied. Roughly the reverse is the case for single-family units. 
 7 
labor market outcomes and entrepreneurship (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald, 2013; Bracke et 
al., 2014; Harding and Rosenthal, 2013; Oswald, 1996), or (v) local political participation and 
land use regulation (e.g., Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2013; Fischel, 2000 and 2001; Hilber and 
Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Ortalo-Magné and Prat, 2014).
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3 Theoretical framework 
In this section we present a simple modified version of the open monocentric city model. Our 
model differs from the standard model in that (i) we explicitly distinguish between two types 
of housing; single-family and multi-family, (ii) we assume that in each period a small fraction 
of all land – already developed or undeveloped – is converted into new residential 
development throughout the city, and (iii) the conversion rate can differ between more central 
and more peripheral locations.  
Our model is static in that we compare the income y in a focal city with the outside income 
y*. In the steady-state y0 equals y*. Our model predicts that if y0 increases to y such that y>y*, 
this will increase the share of multi-family housing in new construction and will lead to new 
construction of smaller units. By implication, if income grows more strongly in our focal city 
than in the nation as a whole, the prediction remains that the share of multi-family housing in 
new construction will increase in the focal city and newly constructed units will be smaller 
compared to the counterfactual with equal income growth rates. 
The empirical implication is that – absent of land use regulations and other restrictions – cities 
that receive a positive income shock, controlling for national-level shocks and city specific 
unobserved characteristics (captured through the inclusion of year and metro area fixed 
effects), will observe an increase in the share of construction of capital-intensive multi-family 
housing and will see smaller units being built.  
We proceed discussing the various components and specific features of our model. 
3.1 Single- and multi-family housing in a monocentric city 
Demand for floor space 
We consider a monocentric city with a homogeneous population and two types of housing: 
single-family (sf) and multi-family (mf). The generalization to an arbitrary number of mf 
dwelling types is discussed in Appendices B and C. Utility is characterized by the function 
 iscuu ,, , where c is a composite consumption good, s is the amount of floor space, and i 
(= sf, mf) indicates the dwelling type. Households can switch between dwelling types, 
however, in each period they can only inhabit one type. Utility is continuously differentiable, 
increasing and quasi-concave in c and s. Floor space in mf units is assumed to be inferior, 
which is reflected in the assumption that    mfscusfscu ,,,,   for all c and s.9 The inverse 
                                                 
8
 Dietz and Haurin (2003) provide a comprehensive survey on the externalities of homeownership such as higher 
political participation, improved health and self-esteem, better child outcomes or greater investment in local 
social capital.  
9
 We treat floor space in mf and sf units as inherently different and, specifically, mf floor space as inferior 
because apartments are much more prone to negative externalities such as noise from neighbors. In the extension 
to an arbitrary number of mf housing types in Appendices B and C, we also assume that the floor space of mf 
units is inferior, but we assume that consumers are indifferent to building height within the mf sector. 
 8 
of the utility function with respect to c,  isuzz ,, , may be interpreted as the amount of 
composite consumption good that has to be offered to a household that lives in a housing unit 
of type i with an amount s of floor space, in order to guarantee utility level u. Its partial 
derivative with respect to s equals minus the willingness to pay for floor space. By 
assumption, this willingness to pay is always larger for floor space in sf housing: 
    smfsuzssfsuz  ,,,,  for all u and s.  
For simplicity we assume that all housing is rented and that rent levels adjust fully to changes 
in market conditions.
10
 Let pi denote the rent of a square unit of floor space in housing of type 
i. Normalizing the price of the composite consumption good to unity, we can then write the 
household budget constraint as iispctxy  , where y denotes income, x is the distance to 
the CBD, and t the transportation cost per distance unit. Equalization of utility within the city 
requires that pi is equal to the bid rent for floor space. This is the maximum amount a 
household can afford to pay for a unit of floor space, while still being able to reach utility 
level u:  
 
 , ,
, , , max
s
y tx z u s i
u x y i
s
 
  .       (1) 
For the floor size s that solves this optimization problem, it holds that: 








 .        (2) 
This equation states that the marginal willingness to pay for floor space equals the amount of 
money per unit of floor space that is available to a household that has to reach utility level u. 
Hence, the equilibrium rent level for each type of housing is equal to the corresponding 
marginal willingness to pay. These bid rents are decreasing convex functions of the distance 
to the city center, and it may be shown that the bid rent function for floor space in mf units 
lies below that for floor space in sf units.
11
  
Demand for developable land 
Developers build and rent out sf and mf units in perfectly competitive markets, implying that 
all their profits disappear into bid rents for residential land. The two types of housing are 
distinguished by the number of square feet of floor space per unit of land. In our model, 
buildings containing mf units, have F square units of floor space per square unit of land, 
whereas sf housing has one square unit of floor space per unit of land. Our data indicate that 
the average number of floors roughly equals 2 in sf housing and 3 in mf housing. Our model 
would capture this proportion by assuming an F of 1.5. However, sf housing often uses more 
land for gardens instead of floor space relative to the mf sector, implying F > 1.5.  
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 Owner-occupied housing could be dealt with by modeling user costs rather than rents. However, in that case 
we would need to take into account the wealth effect of house price changes (capital gains), which can be 
ignored in the standard setting with absentee landowners.  
11
 Suppose this is not the case. If the bid rents for both types of housing would be the actual prices for floor 
space, the budget line for mf housing would lie entirely below that for sf housing. With the indifference curve 
referring to mf housing lying entirely above that for sf housing the consumer would be unable to reach the given 
utility level on which the bid rents are based in both dwelling types. This implies a contradiction. 
 9 
Profits per square unit of land, i , are given by either  , , ,mf mf lF u x y mf C p      or 
 , , ,sf sf lu x y sf C p     , where pl denotes the land rent and Cmf and Csf the (annualized) 
construction costs per square unit of land. While this is not strictly necessary for our model, it 
is conventional to assume that Cmf > Csf.
12
 Setting these profits to zero, we obtain the bid rent 
functions for land: 
   , , , , , , sfu x y sf u x y sf C   ,       (3a) 
   , , , , , , mfu x y mf F u x y mf C    .      (3b) 
Developers choose floor sizes optimally, implying that they choose the floor sizes that solve 
the consumer problem (1).  
Whether mf or sf units are constructed is determined by the highest bid; mf units are built 
when    , , , , , ,u x y mf u x y sf  , or: 
 
 , , ,
, , ,
sf mfu x y sf C C
u x y mf
F
  
  .      (4) 
We would expect to see mf housing close to the city center and single-family housing in the 
suburban ring around the center. This pattern emerges when inequality (4) is satisfied in the 
center and when, at the intersection of the two sectors, the bid rent curve for land in mf 
housing is steeper than the bid rent curve for land in sf housing, or equivalently, when the 
profits associated with the construction of mf housing decrease faster than the profits 
associated with the construction of sf housing: 





.        (5) 
To provide some intuition for this condition, we substitute the expressions for bid rents for 
floor space (1) into condition (5), and use the ‘Muth condition’ that  , , , / iu x y i x t s    . 
We can now rewrite this condition as 1mf sfF s s . Hence, (5) is equivalent to the 
requirement that the household density in the area with mf housing adjacent to the boundary 
between the two sectors exceeds the corresponding density in the area that contains the sf 
housing. If we assume that this mild condition holds, multi-family housing will be nearer to 
the center and single-family housing nearer to the edge of the city. In what follows we assume 
(4) and (5) to be true.  
Figure 1 illustrates bid rents for floor space and land in both sectors as a function of distance 
to the CBD. The black line is the bid rent curve for land. To the left of x*, which is the 
distance that solves expression (4) with equality, this land is used for construction of mf units 
and between x* and x
b
 it is used for construction of sf units. The urban fringe x
b
 is determined 
by the condition that land in sf housing is equally valuable as land in agricultural use. Note 
that the bid rent curve for land is steeper to the left of x* than to the right of it. The grey line 
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 The extended model discussed in Appendices B and C makes the realistic assumption that the construction 
cost per unit of land is convex in the number of floors. 
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between x* and x
b
 is the bid rent for floor space in sf units, it equals the bid rent for land plus 
the costs of constructing floor space in this sector. To the left of x*, the bid rent for floor 
space (of mf-type) drops. This is because it is inferior to floor space in sf units. Yet land is 
more profitable in this usage as unit density jumps up by a sufficient amount.  
Figure 1: Bid rent functions for floor space and land 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of an increase in local income: all bid rent curves are shifted 
outwards by the same amount, and hence, the boundary between the mf and sf sectors and the 
urban fringe shift outwards by this amount as well. More precisely, if income rises by an 
amount Δy, then bid rents shift outward by an amount Δy / t. This is seen for the bid rents for 
floor space by revisiting expression (1): 
 
   
 
, ,
, , , max
, , , ,
s
y y t x y t z u s i
u x y t y y i
s
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   
   
 
   (6) 
and a similar derivation can be made for bid rents for land in expressions (3a) and (3b). As a 
consequence, the nature of new housing supply in terms of type and floor space shifts 
outwards from the CBD by an amount Δy / t as well. 
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Figure 2: Effect of an increase in local income on the bid rent functions 
 
Conversion rates and testable predictions 
In this subsection we derive predictions about the nature of new housing supply in situations 
where housing construction takes place everywhere in the city, consistent with stylized facts 
from the AHS and empirical evidence discussed in Section 2. For ease of exposition we 
assume that in the part of the city where mf housing is constructed, a percentage αmf of all land 
(developed or open and developable) is converted into new housing in each period, while in 
the part of the city where sf housing is constructed a percentage αsf of all land is converted 
into new development in each period. The new development can be thought of as either 
redevelopment of defunct housing stock or as construction of new housing on greenfield or 
brownfield land.
13
 The two percentages αsf and αmf may be different, and in particular αsf may 
be larger than αmf, as suggested by the empirical evidence discussed in Section 2. 
We assume that the conversion rates αi (i = mf, sf) are increasing functions of local income y: 
αi = αi(y). The rationale for this assumption is that the opportunity cost of keeping the land 
open or in the existing (no longer-optimal) use increases with income. We further assume that 
αi is always positive, which means that there will always be some new construction, even if 
local income (growth) is below the national income (growth). This assumption is consistent 
with stylized facts; there has been some new construction of mf and sf housing even during 
Detroit’s worst crisis period.  
                                                 
13
 The conversion rate can be defined formally as the amount of land that is either developed or redeveloped in a 
certain area in each period relative to the total amount of all land (developed and open and developable) in the 
area, both at a given distance from the CBD. So the denominator does not distinguish between open land, already 
developed land (with depreciating capital), or brownfield land. In reality, more redevelopment or brownfield 
development takes place in more central locations. In our model, since empirically we cannot distinguish 
between redevelopment and development of open land, we are only interested in the nature of new housing 
supply. Hence, in our model there is also no need to distinguish between the fraction    that is due to 
redevelopment of depreciated stock or due to new development of open land. 
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We impose that a local income shock brings about the same percentage change in the 
conversion rate for both types of housing, i.e.    mf sfy k y   for some positive constant k. 
This is consistent with the possibility that, when k is markedly smaller than 1, the additional 
amount of land that is converted increases much more for sf housing than for mf housing. For 
example, if k = 2/3 and a given income shock increases mf  from 2 to 3 percent, the 
corresponding sf  increases from 3 to 4.5 percent. Since the outer ring of the city where sf 
construction occurs has a significantly larger surface area, in this example, the total amount of 
new construction of sf housing (in terms of land area) would far exceed that of mf 
construction. The assumption of a positive constant k has the advantage that it keeps the 
model tractable and provides a simple benchmark case. 
The empirical evidence discussed earlier suggests that k < 1. This is consistent with 
theoretical reasoning: Since more central locations are more developed than more remote ones 
and since mf housing requires larger sites, fewer suitable parcels of open land will typically be 
available for construction of mf housing. Thus, building new tall apartment blocks in central 
locations normally implies redevelopment of depreciated properties rather than development 
on an open plot of land. Such redevelopment is typically highly involved – much more 
complex and costly than (re-)development of low density sf housing in more peripheral 
locations. 
With k < 1 there will be a discontinuity in the conversion rate, which arises by assumption, at 
the boundary x* (i.e., mf sf  ). The discontinuity in the conversion rate implies that a 
positive local income shock extends the part of the city where the conversion rate is 
comparably lower, that is, where mf housing is constructed (i.e., the boundary between the mf 
and the sf sector shifts outwards). To the extent that the conversion rate does not drop in the 
part of the city where the local income shock causes a change in the predominant housing 
type (from sf to mf) but instead remains constant or increases, the positive impact of a positive 
income shock on the share of new mf housing construction will be understated (i.e., Prediction 
1 below holds a fortiori).  
We take the city as it has been developed in previous periods as given and consider what 
happens in a single period, say period 1, when the local income level is y and utility, which is 
determined at the national level, is u*. If local income had grown at the national average, its 
value would be y*. In what follows we refer to the situation, in which y > y* as a local 
increase in income (holding national income constant).  
Let  iN y  denote the number of newly built units of type i when local income equals y. The 
quantity  iN y  is computed by multiplying the unit density that solves the consumer problem 
in (1) with the amount of newly converted land at each distance from the CBD, and then 
integrating this product over x. Our first prediction about the composition of new urban 
housing supply can be expressed as: 
Prediction 1: A local increase in income, holding national income constant, raises the 
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and an analogous implication holds for the opposite inequality. 
Proof. See Appendix C.  
We already discussed the intuition for this result above: a rise in local income pushes up land 
prices everywhere in the city, which in turn leads to substitution away from land in the 
housing production process. This also implies that the amount of floor space in newly 
constructed units decreases with local income. At the aggregate city level, this will be the case 
if the number of newly constructed units increases more strongly than the amount of land 
devoted to these new units. To state this formally, let  iA y  denote the amount of land 
converted to use for new construction of units of type i when income rises from y0 to y. The 
average amount of floor space in newly built units in the mf and sf sector is then given by 
( ) ( ) / ( )mf mf mfs y FA y N y  and ( ) ( ) / ( )sf sf sfs y A y N y . We can express our second prediction 
as: 
Prediction 2: A local increase in income, holding national income constant, lowers the 
average amount of floor space in newly built units of both types. More formally; y>y* 
implies: 
( ) ( *)i is y s y           (8) 
and an analogous implication holds for the opposite inequality. 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Convexities of the bid rent curves and of the land price curves imply that as these curves shift 
outwards after a rise in local income, the resulting increase in land prices is larger in more 
central locations, which are the locations where mf construction takes place. Hence, we would 
expect substitution processes in housing production to be stronger in this sector. However, we 
cannot prove that this property necessarily follows from the assumptions made thus far and 
we therefore formulate it as a conjecture:  
Conjecture: A local increase in income, holding national income constant, lowers the 
average amount of floor space in newly built mf units more strongly than in newly built sf 
units. More formally; y>y* implies: 
( ) ( )
( *) ( *)
mf sf
mf sf
s y s y
s y s y
          (9) 
and an analogous implication holds for the opposite inequality. 
To offer concrete support for this conjecture we carried out a simulation exercise, employing 
parameter values for the Boston metropolitan area, provided by DiPasquale and Wheaton 
(1996).  DiPasquale and Wheaton demonstrate that population density as a function of 
distance to the CBD may be accurately described with an exponential density function. For 
1990, the population density is estimated to decrease with 9% per mile and the intercept of the 
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density function is 8.8. Furthermore, roughly 75% of an imaginary circle around the CBD is 
urban land, and the rest is sea. Assuming an exponential density function with these 
parameters, we can compute the boundaries x* and x
b
 in such a way that the total population 
in the area is 3.86 million people, as reported by DiPasquale and Wheaton, and that 50% of all 
units is mf, as reported in the 1993 metro AHS. This yields a boundary between the mf and sf 
sectors at 15 miles from the CBD and an urban fringe at 30 miles from the CBD. DiPasquale 
and Wheaton show that the large majority of the residential development in their data is 
located within 30 miles from the CBD. Hence, his approach appears to generate sensible 
results. These assumptions suffice to verify that our Conjecture holds by a wide margin. 
Hence, we investigate its validity in our empirical analysis as well.  
3.2 The role of land use regulation 
Our predictions about the nature of new housing supply were derived under the assumption of 
competitive land and housing markets. However, many metropolitan areas in the US are 
subject to tight land use controls. Land use zoning determines where new housing can be 
built. Zoning and other types of building controls also affect the nature of new supply (e.g., 
single-family versus multi-family zones; minimum lot size restrictions; caps on density; 
permissions to subdivide existing units). All these factors drive a wedge between the pure 
market outcome and the effective ‘political-economy’ outcome. For example, in regulated 
markets, floor sizes of new housing units are likely no longer the outcome of bid rent 
optimization, as in the consumer problem (1). Similarly, restrictions on the construction of mf 
housing overrule the outcome of the producer problem, in which x* is determined according 
to the highest and best use (i.e., that use that produces the highest value for a property). 
Finally, land use restrictions may also affect the long-run supply curve of residential land 
(Green et al., 2005; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2014; Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Saiz, 2010). As 
a consequence, our predictions may no longer hold in metro areas that are severely regulated.  
This breakdown is illustrated in Figure 3 for the case of a restriction that rules out mf 
construction beyond x*, the fringe between the mf and sf segments before the change in 
income. The restriction is indicated by the bold vertical line. The continuous black line 
indicates land rents before the income change – it is identical to the continuous black line in 
Figure 1. The black and grey dashed lines indicate bid rents for land in mf and sf use 
respectively after the income change. Since developers do not have the possibility to allocate 
land to its highest and best use, prices drop at x*.  
The rise in land rents in the mf segment will induce a reduction in average floor size, so that 
the number of newly constructed mf units will rise after a positive income shock. However, it 
rises by less than in the case without the restriction, since the amount of land that is attributed 
to new mf construction is smaller. After the income shock, the number of newly constructed sf 
units rises as well, and it rises by more than in the case without the restriction. Hence, it is not 
clear anymore whether Prediction 1 still holds. Prediction 2 would still seem to apply in this 
case; floor sizes are lower, in particular in the mf sector. However, in cities where local 
planning boards impose restrictions on conversion of land to the mf sector, minimum lot size 
restrictions may also be present. The latter would render Prediction 2 ambiguous as well. 
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Hence, in cities with relatively tight land use regulation, little can be said about the impact of 
local income shocks on the composition of new construction.  
Figure 3: Restrictions on rezoning to the mf sector 
 
4 Data, empirical strategy, and baseline specification 
4.1 The data 
Our data comes from the AHS metropolitan area datasets for the years 1984 to 2004, obtained 
through HUD User. The US Census conducted these AHS metro surveys annually between 
1984 and 1993 and at irregular dates after that. In each year, a different set of MSAs was 
surveyed. In total, we have information for 47 MSAs and the average number of times that an 
MSA is surveyed is 3.6. See Appendix Table A1 (in Appendix D) for a list of all MSAs and 
the years they were surveyed in the AHS. For our period of observation, definitions of the 




Our main measure of local economic conditions, the MSA-level income per capita, is derived 
from the Regional Economic Information System of the BEA.
15
 From this dataset we also 
construct a proxy for construction wages by dividing total earnings in the construction 
industry by employment. The County Business Patterns (CBP) dataset  provides employment 
data. We use this data to generate two additional variables: the employment growth in the 
MSA and a measure indicating a labor demand shock (our instrument to identify employment 
growth). In computing this labor demand shock variable we follow Saks (2008), using the 
same underlying data and methodology.  
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 In 1984, variable definitions changed significantly compared to earlier years. This prevented us from going 
back further in time. 2004 was the latest available AHS-metro year at the point of data collection. 
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 In our baseline estimates we use income per capita rather than wages as our proxy for local economic 
conditions. This is because income per capita arguably more fully captures demand side shocks in the housing 
market. However, as a robustness check (not reported), we replicated our analysis using wages (derived from the 
County Business Pattern) and our findings are essentially unchanged. 



















Finally, in order to distinguish MSAs with more stringent land use controls from those with 
less stringent ones, we use two indices of regulatory restrictiveness. The first index, 
developed by Saks (2008) is the simple average of six independent surveys conducted during 
the late 1970s and the 1980s. The method of index construction and the underlying surveys 
are described in detail in Saks (2008). The second index, the Wharton Residential Land Use 
Regulatory Index (WRLURI), is derived from a survey conducted during the early 2000s (see 
Gyourko et al., 2008, and Saiz, 2010, for details). Both indices aggregate information on 
many different types of land use regulation at the level of municipalities. Since our data spans 
the period from the early 1980s up to the early 2000s, we create a new ‘combined index’ by 
averaging the Saks and WRLURI indices and we proceed by using this combined index in our 
empirical analysis.
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 We note however that our results remain virtually unchanged if we use 
either the Saks index or the WRLURI instead of the combined index.  
4.2 Empirical strategy, measures of new housing supply, and panel dataset 
Our aim is to estimate, at the MSA-level, the impact of local economic conditions on the 
nature of new housing supply. We do this by regressing MSA-level measures of the type and 
size of newly built housing units on local income – our focal explanatory variable – and local 
construction wages. We include the latter variable as a control, to disentangle the effect of our 
focal variable from labor cost-induced changes in construction costs. The MSA-level 
measures that capture the type and size of newly built units are derived by averaging each 
characteristic over the MSA, year of construction, and year of observation (i.e., the survey 
year). Specifically, we aggregate up the following housing unit level measures from the AHS 
metro surveys: (1) an indicator that equals 1 if the unit is of the mf type and 0 otherwise, (2) 
the unit square footage if the unit is of the mf type, and (3) the unit square footage if the unit is 
of the sf type. Formally, we compute: 
 , ,   l lt MSA hM E M t MSA ,        (10) 
where 
l
hM  is the value that variable   1,2,3
lM l  takes for housing unit h. We compute 
the expected value of this variable, for houses that are built in year τ and observed in an AHS 
survey of MSA in year t.  
To illustrate our computation procedure, consider the share of housing built in Boston in 1994 
that is of the mf type. First, we construct a dummy variable that is equal to one if a housing 
unit h is of the mf type (as defined in the AHS) and zero otherwise. The AHS metro sample 
for Boston in year t = 1998 (the earliest year after 1994 with a survey for Boston) provides us 
with information about the characteristics of a sample of housing units in this MSA, as well as 
the year in which these units were built. Hence, the value of this measure for τ = 1994 can be 
obtained by averaging the dummy variable over all housing units in this 1998-sample that 
were built in 1994. In this particular example, we assume that the housing units that were 
constructed in 1994 and observed in 1997, did neither change their type nor their square 
footage during the three year time window.  
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 For two MSAs we do not observe the Saks index. We use instead the WRLURI. For one MSA we do not 
observe the WRLURI. For this MSA we use instead the Saks index. Thus we can assign a regulatory 
restrictiveness measure to each MSA in our sample. 
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The assumption that housing characteristics do not change between the year of construction τ 
and the year t in which the unit is observed in the AHS survey, is essential to our 
identification strategy. To ensure that we do not include any housing units that converted 
from mf to sf housing and vice versa, we drop all units, for which the AHS reports the 
construction year τ as a period of several years. This is the case for older houses; units that 
were built two decades or more before they are observed in the AHS. We maintain that 
conversions of units that are younger than 20 years are extremely rare.  
Expansions of existing units – especially of sf housing – during renovations are more 
common. However, it would appear to be highly unlikely that such changes in unit size occur 
during the first ten or even fifteen years after construction. Hence, we include housing units in 
our analysis if the gap between t and τ is 10 years or less. In a robustness check, reported 
below, we narrow down this window further to 5 years and we also apply a time window of 
10 years and 5 years, respectively, to compute the share of mf housing.  
By computing measures of the nature of new housing supply according to (10) and subject to 
the conditions discussed above, we ultimately obtain a panel dataset in which the year of 
construction τ constitutes the time dimension and the cluster identifiers are AHS wave-MSA 
combinations t × MSA. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the resulting panel dataset. 
Apart from reporting the standard descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation), we 
decompose the standard deviation into within and between cluster dimensions. This is 
relevant for our purposes because all estimates that are reported in the subsequent section are 
identified on variation within clusters only. Table 1 also reports overall minima and maxima, 
the number of clusters, and the number of observed cells.  
As indicated in Panel A of Table 1, 167 t × MSA combinations are observed. The means in 
this panel are sensible and generally straightforward to interpret. 29.8 percent of newly 
constructed units are part of a mf structure. Units in the sf sector are on average significantly 
larger than in the mf sector. The average population size of an AHS-metro area is nearly 3 
million, that is, our regression sample consists mainly of large MSAs. The variation of 
variables is usually larger between than within clusters, particularly for income per capita, 
population and construction wages. Only for the unit square footage of mf housing the 
variation within is larger than between clusters. Panels B and C of Table 1 document the 
descriptive statistics of our three measures characterizing the nature of new housing supply 
for the subset of MSA-cells, in which land use regulation is less restrictive or more restrictive 
than in the average cell. The mean of the three measures is similar for the sub-groups.  
4.3 Econometric baseline model 
Our main results are derived from the following specification: 
     1 21 1log log                lt MSA t MSA t MSAMSA MSAM C D Y W ,  (11) 
where t MSAC   is a fixed effect that is specific to each MSA and to the year t in which it was 
surveyed in the AHS, D  is a time fixed effect that is specific to the construction year τ, 
 1 MSAY  is the one-year-lagged per capita income, and  1 MSAW  is the one-year-lagged wage 
level in the construction industry – a proxy for construction costs. The one year lag in the 
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latter two variables can be expected to capture the natural planning/development lag in the 
construction process. (We experimented with alternative lags and discuss the findings of these 
robustness checks below.) 
Most metropolitan areas are surveyed several times between 1980 and 2004 (see Table A1 in 
Appendix D for details), and for each time they appear in the AHS, we enter a separate fixed 
effect. These fixed effects control fully for all time-invariant heterogeneity at the MSA-level 
and for any heterogeneity across different AHS samples for the same MSA. The year fixed 
effects, D , control for all national level economic shocks at the time of construction. Hence, 
we can interpret the estimated coefficient    as the impact of local income, holding national-
level income constant. All remaining heterogeneity is absorbed by the error term
t MSA    . In 
the estimation of (11), we account for variation in the number of observations in the AHS on 
which each t × MSA × τ cell is estimated  (and hence the precision of this estimate) by using 
Weighted Least Squares.
17
 Furthermore, reported standard errors are clustered at the level of t 
× MSA cells.  
5 Empirical results  
5.1 Results for base line specifications 
Table 2 presents results for the base line specification with MSA  survey year plus 
construction year-fixed effects as in (11). The dependent variables are the share of mf housing 
in new construction (column 1) and the log square footage of sf and mf housing (columns 2 
and 3). The focal coefficient in column 1 reveals that an increase in local income, holding 
national level income and unobserved time-invariant characteristics at the MSA-level 
constant, increases the share of mf housing in new construction, consistent with our Prediction 
1. The relationship between one-year-lagged local income and the share of mf housing in new 
construction is not only highly statistically significant but economically reasonably 
meaningful: an MSA that receives a one-time positive local income shock that raises local 
income 10 percent more than that at the national level, all else equal, will observe an increase 
in the share of mf housing in new construction by 6.4 percentage points. Local wages in the 
construction industry, interestingly, do not appear to have an independent effect, neither on 
the share of new mf housing in construction nor on the size of newly built mf or sf units. 
Columns 2 and 3 reveal, consistent with our Prediction 2, that an increase in local income, 
holding national income constant, reduces the floor size of newly constructed housing units, 
in both the mf and the sf sector. Moreover, the adverse effect is stronger in the mf sector, 
consistent with the Conjecture, which we formulated in the theory section. An MSA that 
receives a one-time positive local income shock that raises local income 10 percent more than 
national level income, all else equal, will observe a reduction in the unit square footage by 4.8 
percent in the sf sector and by 16.8 percent in the mf sector, respectively. 
Since all our specifications reported in Table 2 include construction year fixed effects, all our 
effects of local income control for income at the US national level. The construction year 
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 Time-varying weights are not allowed in a fixed effects estimator. Hence, we use as weights the number of 
observations, on which each cell is based, averaged over all observations in the same cluster that are based on at 
least one AHS observation. 
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fixed effects (time dummies) themselves reveal trends in the dependent variables at the 
national level that are unexplained by our other explanatory variables (i.e., by the MSA-level 
fixed effects and by the local income per capita and construction wage measures). Appendix 
Table A2 (in Appendix D) reports the suppressed time dummies and reveals that aggregate 
trends in the dependent variables have been substantial. Notably, conditional on the time-
varying and time-invariant local controls, there is a significant and continuous downward 
trend in the share of mf housing in aggregate construction and a significant upward trend in 
the unit surface of newly built units, particularly in the mf sector. The effect of raising income 
appears to have the opposite affect at the national level compared to the local level, consistent 
with theory. 
5.2 The impact of land use regulation 
Table 3 reports relationships between local income per capita and our three measures that 
capture the local nature of new housing supply separately for metro areas, in which land use 
regulation is more (Panel A) and less (Panel B) stringent than the average.  
Consistent with our conjectures formulated in Section 3.2, our results strongly indicate that 
land use regulation mutes the responsiveness of the type and size of new housing supply to 
local income shocks. The coefficients reported in Panel A of Table 3 reveal that lagged 
income per capita has no statistically significant effect on the nature of new housing supply in 
comparably more restrictive US metro areas.  
In contrast, in the sample of metro areas with comparably lax land use control (Panel B of 
Table 3), the estimated effects are consistent with Predictions 1 and 2 and with the 
Conjecture. Moreover the effects are slightly more pronounced when compared to our 
baseline estimates for the full sample reported in Table 2. In particular, we find that a 10% 
rise in income relative to the national trend is associated with an increase in the share of mf 
housing by almost 8.8 percentage points (compared to 6.4 percentage points in the baseline 
specification). Now, we also find a significant negative impact of wages in the construction 
industry on the share of new mf housing in construction. This could be because building mf 
housing is more labor intensive compared to sf housing. Overall, the results reported in Table 
3 strongly suggest that Predictions 1 and 2 and our Conjecture only hold in metro areas that 
have comparably lax land use regulation – they do not hold in places with tight control. 
5.3 Are results driven by migration across cities? 
Our empirical findings above are consistent with predictions derived from an open 
monocentric city model, in which demand for land is fully elastic as a consequence of costless 
migration across cities. In other words, our underlying theoretical framework suggests that 
migration is crucial to understanding why positive local income shocks lead to a greater share 
of construction of mf housing and of smaller units at the local level. 
In order to test for the appropriateness of this interpretation of the estimation results, we relate 
the same measures of the nature of new housing supply to migration rather than income. As is 
common in the literature (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992 or Saks, 2008), we use employment 
growth as a proxy for net incoming migration. 
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Employment growth (or the net incoming migration) is obviously endogenous. Migration 
depends not only on demand shocks, but also on the extent to which housing supply 
accommodates such shocks, as has been recently shown by Glaeser et al. (2006) and Saks 
(2008). While these studies establish the impact of the housing supply side in terms of the 
number of newly built units, the same will arguably hold for housing characteristics, as 
migrants have a comparably strong demand for mf units and small units. This is because 
migrants tend to have preferences for renting and, as discussed in Section 2, rental units are 
overrepresented in mf structures. 
In order to identify the causal effect of employment growth on our measures that characterize 
the nature of new housing supply, we use an instrument proposed by Bartik (1991) and 
applied in empirical work, for example, by Blanchard and Katz (1992), Saks (2008), or Hilber 
and Vermeulen (2014). Specifically, we instrument for employment growth with a “labor 
demand shock variable” that equals the weighted average of national industry employment 
growth rates, where weights are equal to the lagged share of an industry’s employment 
relative to total MSA employment. Intuitively, if an MSA has a large proportion of its jobs in 
an industry that is doing well at the national level, this MSA is predicted to have a high 
employment growth rate. The underlying idea is that both national industry specific demand 
shocks and the lagged industry composition of MSA employment are exogenous to local 
employment growth.  
The results are reported in Table 4. Panel A first reports simple OLS results of the effect of 
lagged local employment growth on our three measures capturing the nature of new housing 
supply. The results are qualitatively very similar to those reported in Table 2 for our baseline 
specification. Next we repeat this exercise but split our sample again into more and less 
regulated metro areas (Panels B and C). Again, we find strong effects with the expected signs 
in less regulated metro areas and the effects are again more pronounced than for the full 
sample. In more regulated areas we find that local employment growth is associated with a 
decrease rather than an increase in the share of mf housing and this effect is marginally 
statistically significant. There is no statistically significant effect of employment growth on 
the size of newly constructed housing units, consistent with our earlier findings and with our 
theoretical conjectures. 
Finally, in Panels D1 and D2 we report the findings of our instrumental variable approach: 
Panel D1 reports the 2
nd
 stage of our TSLS estimates (along with a test statistic of the strength 
of the first stage) and Panel D2 reports the corresponding 1
st
 stage results. The results are 
based on the sample of MSAs with comparably lax land use regulation only. We confine our 
sample to these MSAs because strict land use controls were demonstrated by Glaeser et al. 
(2006) and Saks (2008) to also prevent in-migration (i.e., house prices adjust rather than the 
composition of the housing stock), thus impairing the strength of our identification.
18
 The 
findings provide support for the proposition that the housing supply adjustments in metro 
areas with comparably lax land use regulation are driven by migration. Employment growth 
in these metro areas has a causal positive effect on the share of mf housing in new 
                                                 
18
 We also estimated the specifications for the full sample that includes MSAs with strict land use controls. As 
expected, the results are much less clear-cut. 
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construction and a causal negative effect on the size of newly constructed housing, consistent 
with our Predictions 1 and 2. Moreover, the adverse causal effect on the size of new units is 
more pronounced for mf units, consistent with our theoretical Conjecture.  
5.4 Robustness checks 
We carried out a number of robustness checks. The results are reported in Appendix Tables 
A3 and A4 (in Appendix D). Table A3 presents estimation results for our baseline model but 
we assume that the explanatory variables are either contemporaneous or lagged by 2 years. A 
one year lag seemed most sensible to use given stylized facts about delays imposed by the 
planning and construction process. However, one could also make a case for a shorter or 
longer lag. The findings of the sensitivity test suggest that the main effects are robust, 
although unsurprisingly, they slightly decrease in strength if we use 2-year lagged income per 
capita.  
As discussed in Section 4.2, the assumption that housing characteristics do not change 
between the year of construction and the year in which the unit is observed in the AHS, is 
crucial to our identification strategy. In our base specification we include, subject to some 
constraints, all units to compute the share mf housing and we apply a maximum time window 
of 10 years for the gap between the year of construction and the AHS survey year for the 
purpose of computing the mf and sf floor size indices. In Table A4 we report the findings of 
robustness checks, in which we impose even narrower time windows. Specifically, we check 
the sensitivity of our results for the share mf measure by introducing a time window and by 
limiting this to a maximum of 10 years and 5 years (columns 1 and 2), respectively, and we 
explore the robustness of our findings for the mf and sf floor size measures by limiting the 
time window to a maximum of 5years (columns 3 and 4). Overall, the main results do not 
change significantly, even when these narrower windows are applied and the sample sizes, as 
a consequence, are significantly reduced. 
6 Conclusions 
Local economic conditions have a strong impact on the composition (type and size) of newly 
constructed housing units in a metro area. When one-year lagged local income rises, 
controlling for changes in income at the national level, more multi-family units and smaller 
units are being constructed in a metro area. 
The standard urban economic model is a useful starting point for explaining these findings. In 
an open monocentric city where utility can be considered to be exogenous because of costless 
migration across cities, rising incomes should lead to higher land prices and therefore a higher 
capital intensity of land use. In this paper we propose a modified version of the open 
monocentric city model, in which this effect is brought about through substitution from 
single-family to multi-family construction and through a reduction of the square footage of 
dwellings, consistent with our main empirical findings.  
Slicing our data with respect to the stringency of land use regulation, we find that the market 
responses that one would expect on the basis of our theoretical considerations are muted in 
MSAs with tight land use restrictions. Presumably this is mainly because zoning measures 
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that limit development densities prevent that rising local incomes trigger a substitution 
process towards multi-family structures and smaller units within these structures. 
This has implications for the functioning of housing and labor markets alike. Cities in which 
incomes rise faster than the national trend are likely to attract migrants who exert a demand 
for temporary rental accommodation until they have decided whether and where to settle more 
permanently in the city. Rental multi-family structures are arguably the most efficient way to 
meet these housing needs and in metro areas with lax land use controls, developers are likely 
to deliver this (profit-maximizing) type of new housing. However, in markets with tight 
regulation the labor supply response to demand shocks is likely muted and this hampers urban 
(job) growth in flourishing areas, in line with the arguments put forward by Glaeser et al. 
(2006) and Saks (2008). While this previous work highlights the fact that regulatory 
constraints limit the quantity of newly developed housing, our findings suggest that they also 
hamper adjustment of the housing stock composition. Land use constraints thus create a 
mismatch in both housing and labor markets and this has particularly adverse effects in 
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Metro area-level summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Between Within Min Max Clusters 
A. Full sample - no metro-dimension 
Share multi-family (mf) units 1829 0.298 0.169 0.127 0.118 0 0.939 167 
Unit square footage, sf 1548 2453 427 328 288 900 4500 167 
Unit square footage, mf 1513 2093 1001 699 745 340 5000 167 
Income per capita (p.a.) 1829 17855 6448 6377 3623 7616 42030 167 
Employment growth 1829 0.0210 0.0241 0.0130 0.0209 -0.0619 0.103 167 
Labor demand shock variable 1829 -0.0149 0.0207 0.00772 0.0194 -0.0862 0.0426 167 
MSA population 1829 2872300 2956012 2937453 203213 635318 17000000 167 
Wage per employee in construction sector (p.a.) 1829 28597 7695 7465 4296 14546 56520 167 
Share of units in sample built between 1969-1979 1829 0.0689 0.253 0.0510 .2495278 0 1 167 
Share of units in sample built during 1980s 1829 0.599 0.490 0.354 .3697993 0 1 167 
Share of units in sample built during 1990s 1829 0.276 0.447 0.325 .327798 0 1 167 
Share of units in sample built between 2000-2004 1829 0.0569 0.232 0.271 .1281069 0 1 167 
Share developed residential land (excl. industrial) 1829 0.142 0.104 0.102 0 .0327 0.501 167 
Average regulatory restrictiveness 1829 0.142 0.714 0.714 0 -1.119 1.889 167 
B. Metro areas with regulatory restrictiveness<average 
Share mf units 918 0.285 0.165 0.120 0.121 0 .826 83 
Unit square footage, sf 769 2436 400 331 247 1525 4017 83 
Unit square footage, mf 749 2021 987 690 737 403 5000 83 
C. Metro areas with regulatory restrictiveness>average 
Share mf units 911 0.311 0.173 0.134 0.114 0 0.939 84 
Unit square footage, sf 779 2469 452 325 324 900 4500 84 




Base specifications (weighted fixed effects models, full sample) 
Dependent variables: Characteristics of newly built housing stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share mf 
units 
Log (unit sq. 
foot, sf) 
Log (unit sq. 
foot, mf) 
Log(Personal income per capita),  
1-year lagged 
0.640*** -0.484** -1.676*** 
(0.130) (0.223) (0.556) 
Log(Construction sector annual wage per 
employee), 1-year lagged 
-0.117 -0.00942 0.208 
(0.105) (0.112) (0.316) 
Metro area   AHS-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year built-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.686*** 12.58*** 22.06*** 
(0.960) (1.983) (4.687) 
Observations 1829 1548 1513 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 167 167 167 
R-squared within 0.242 0.178 0.063 
  between 0.307 0.047 0.0003 
  overall 0.234 0.043 0.003 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10%. 
 
Coefficients and robust standard errors of year built-fixed effects are 











More Regulated versus Less Regulated Metro Areas 
Dependent variables: Characteristics of newly built housing stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share mf 
units 
Log (unit sq.  
foot, sf) 
Log (unit sq.  
foot, mf) 
Panel A: More regulated metropolitan areas 
Log(Personal income per capita),  
1-year lagged 
-0.0336 -0.0759 0.207 
(0.276) (0.439) (1.060) 
Log(Construction sector annual wage per employee), 
1-year lagged 
0.193 -0.161 -0.413 
(0.138) (0.170) (0.442) 
Metro area   AHS-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year built-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.296 10.19*** 10.16 
(2.137) (3.467) (8.117) 
Observations 911 779 764 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 84 84 84 
R-squared within 0.217 0.184 0.085 
  between 0.387 0.128 0.373 
  overall 0.271 0.102 0.151 
Panel B: Less regulated metropolitan areas 
Log(Personal income per capita),  
1-year lagged 
0.878*** -0.597*** -2.509*** 
(0.142) (0.172) (0.424) 
Log(Construction sector annual wage per employee), 
1-year lagged 
-0.339*** 0.0943 0.628 
(0.127) (0.152) (0.439) 
Metro area   AHS-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year built-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.674*** 12.56*** 25.68*** 
(1.273) (1.824) (5.110) 
Observations 918 769 749 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 83 83 83 
R-squared within 0.334 0.237 0.107 
  between 0.350 0.075 0.003 
  overall 0.281 0.074 0.015 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%. Sample split is based on the mean of an index of regulatory tightness during the late 1970s / early 1980s 





Are the Results Driven by Migration? (OLS- and TSLS-Estimates) 
 




Log (unit sq.  
foot, sf) 
Log (unit sq.  
foot, mf) 
Panel A: Full sample (OLS) 
Employment growth,  
1-year lagged 
0.660** -0.392* -2.254*** 
(0.309) (0.233) (0.779) 
Log(Construction cost sector annual wage per 
employee), 1-year lagged 
0.150* -0.197* -0.425 
(0.0764) (0.105) (0.282) 
Fixed effects and controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1829 1548 1513 
R-squared within/between/overall 0.23/0.50/0.31 0.17/0.15/0.11 .060/.072/.060 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 167 167 167 
Panel B: More regulated metropolitan areas (OLS) 
Employment growth,  
1-year lagged 
-0.675* 0.394 0.636 
(0.399) (0.297) (1.088) 
Log(Construction cost sector annual wage per 
employee), 1-year lagged 
0.180 -0.195 -0.340 
(0.118) (0.150) (0.355) 
Fixed effects and controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 911 779 764 
R-squared within/between/overall 0.22/0.36/0.26 0.19/0.13/0.10 0.085/0.24/0.12 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 84 84 84 
Panel C: Less regulated metropolitan areas (OLS) 
Employment growth,  
1-year lagged 
0.979** -0.769*** -3.217*** 
(0.388) (0.230) (0.850) 
Log(Construction cost sector annual wage per 
employee), 1-year lagged 
0.00280 -0.105 -0.365 
(0.114) (0.136) (0.463) 
Fixed effects and controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 918 769 749 
R-squared within/between/overall 0.32/0.63/0.39 0.23/0.24/0.17 .093/.0001/.025 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 83 83 83 
Panel D1: Less regulated metropolitan areas (TSLS, 2
nd
 stage) 




1.614*** -1.665* -3.539* 
(0.580) (1.011) (1.925) 
Log(Construction cost sector annual wage per 
employee), 1-year lagged 
-0.00943 -0.103 -0.374 
(0.115) (0.135) (0.459) 
Fixed effects 
2)
 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 918 769 749 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 83 83 83 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic (First-stage F) 12.79 15.68 23.93 
 




Employment growth,  
1-year lagged 
Labor demand shock, 1-year lagged 1.580*** 1.540***  2.300***    
(0.442) (0.389)     (0.470)     
Log(Construction cost sector annual wage per 
employee), 1-year lagged 
-0.00104 -0.00193 -0.0221    
(0.0233) (0.0276)     (0.0278)    
Centered/uncentered R-squared 0.104 0.083 0.144 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%. 
1) 
Bold variable is endogenous. Excluded instrument is labor demand shock variable. 
2) 
Year built-






Appendix A: Appendix Figure 
 
Figure A1 
Property Development in New York City by Year of Construction 
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Appendix B: A model with an arbitrary number of dwelling types 
 
This Appendix introduces an extended version of the model developed in the main text that 
has an arbitrary number of housing types. That is, we distinguish houses with F1, F2, F3, ..., FJ 
floors, with F1 < F2 < F3 < … < FJ. Houses of type 1 are sf, all other types are mf. The model 
of the main text may be interpreted as referring to a situation in which J = 2 and both types of 
dwellings are present in the city. Alternatively (and more realistically) it may be interpreted as 
referring to a condensed version of the present model with an arbitrary number of housing 
types in which type 1 housing is sf housing and types 2 – J are aggregated into one single mf 
housing sector. It may also be argued that this interpretation fits our empirical analysis best, in 
which we are unable to distinguish between different types of mf housing. 
In the two-type model discussed in the main text we have assumed that floor space in mf 
housing is inferior to floor space in sf housing. In this extension, we also assume that this is 
the case, however, we further assume that preferences for floor space within the mf sector do 
not depend on the number of floors in the building, i.e. individuals are indifferent with respect 
to the height of mf housing. (This is consistent with e.g. the proposition that households 
dislike noise from their neighbors below, above, and next door. Whether a household lives in 
say the 4
th
 floor or the 10
th
 floor arguably does not much alter the noise perception.) This 
implies that bid rent functions for floor space  , , ,u x y mf  are identical for all types of mf 
housing. Since floor sizes are chosen to optimize this bid rent function (see equation (1)), 
optimal floor sizes increase monotonously with distance to the CBD.  
Developers switch from Fi to Fi+1 if: 
   1 1, , , , , ,i i i iF u x y mf C F u x y mf C      ,      (A1) 
where i refers to the number of floors. The number of floors of mf housing will be a 
decreasing step function of the distance to the CBD, if we make the additional assumption 
that the construction cost per unit of land is convex in the number of floors, i.e. 1i iC C   is 
increasing in i. This assumption seems realistic as higher buildings require more investment in 
foundations, solid construction materials, or elevators.  
The number of housing types available in a city is endogenously determined by bid rents for 
floor space and construction costs. In larger cities, these bid rents will generally be higher in 
central areas, so that there is more high-rise construction. As a consequence, it may happen 
that a new type of housing will be introduced after a positive income shock, or that an existing 
type will disappear after a negative income shock. For i > 1, we let  *ix y  denote the 
boundary between type i and type i – 1 housing when income equals y. For i = 1 it refers to 
the boundary of the city. Let J(y) ≤ J denote the number of housing types present in the city 
when income equals y. Then the boundaries  *ix y  are defined for dwelling types 1, ..., J(y). 
Finally, the conversion rate in the part of the city where type i dwellings are optimal is   ( ), 
and we make the proportionality assumption:    1i iy k y   for i=2, …, J. In practice we 
expect that 1 > k2,  ... , > kJ, i.e., a higher share of land is converted closer to the urban fringe.  
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Appendix C: Proofs of Predictions 1 and 2 
 
This Appendix proves Predictions 1 and 2 in the more general context of a model with an 
arbitrary number of floors. Suppose two housing types i and j, i > j are the optimal types for 
new construction in some sectors of the city when income is y*. A sufficient condition for 
Prediction 1 to hold in this more general model is that when y > y*, we have:  
   
 






N y N yN y N y
N y N y

 ,       (A2) 
which says that the additional growth in new type i units caused by a more than average 
increase in local income exceeds the additional growth in new type j units. If this inequality 
holds for all i > 1, i.e. the additional growth in any type i units caused by a more than average 
increase in local income exceeds the additional growth in new sf (type 1) units, then any 
weighted average of these growth rates also exceeds the additional growth in new sf units. 
Hence, prediction 1 continues to hold when we aggregate types 2 – J into one single category 
of mf housing, as in the model in the main text. 
In order to show that (A2) is valid, we first consider the case where i < J(y*), i.e. a type of 
housing that will not be constructed in the city center when y = y*. If income in the city equals 
y*, the number of new type i units is given by: 












N y y g x y xdx 

         (A3) 
Where  , *ig x y  is the density of type i units, i.e. the number of housing units per unit of 
land. If income rises to y, this number equals: 
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  .        (A4) 
Denoting *y y y   , expression (A4) may be rewritten by using the properties 
   * * * *i ix y y x y y t    and     , * , *i ig x y y g x y t y   , which both follow 
from the fact that income growth shifts the bid rent curve outwards in an open city (see 
expression (6)). This yields: 
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   .     (A6) 
The growth in new type i units, triggered by a rise in income from y* to y, then follows as: 
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   .      (A8) 
The value ˆ
ix  may be interpreted as the weighted mean of x over the interval
   1 * * , * *i ix y x y   , where the weighting function is given by  , *ig x y . 
In a similar way, we may derive an expression for the relative increase in construction of type 
j units if income rises from y* to y: 
   
 
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  .      (A9) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equations (A7) and (A9) is the same for both types, 
because of the proportionality assumption. However, as units of type i are closer to the CBD 
than units of type j, we must have ˆ ˆi jx x . Thus the validity of inequality (A2) follows. 
If i = J(y*) and type i dwellings start in the CBD, then the additional growth in new type i 
units caused by a more than average increase in local income can only increase relative to 
equation (A7), because the inner boundary of the sector where this type is constructed does 
not have to shift out – it is possible that type i will be constructed in the CBD also if income 
rises to y. Hence, inequality (A2) holds a fortiori.  
In order to proof Prediction 2 for the generalized model, we first show that ( ) ( *)i is y s y  for 
y* > y, which is equivalent to: 
   
 
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If the number of new units of type i grows more strongly than the amount of land on which it 
is built, it must be the case that the average amount of floor space per unit falls.  
Again, we start by considering the case i < J(y*). By definition we have: 
         
2 2
1* * * * * *i i i iA y y x y x y   
  
 
,     (A11) 
and:  
       
2 2
1* * * *i i i i
y y
A y y x y x y
t t
   
     
       
     
,    (A12) 
where in (A12) we have again made use of the equality    * * *i ix y x y y t   .  
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We may rewrite this equation as: 
   
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With some manipulation, it follows that: 
   
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Hence, making use of equation (A7), we obtain: 
   
 
   
 
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.  (A15) 
Inequality (A10) follows because we have: 
    1
1
ˆ * * * *
2
i i ix x y x y  .        (A16) 
Recall that ˆix  may be interpreted as the weighted mean of x over the interval 
   1 * * , * *i ix y x y   , where the weighting function is given by  , *ig x y . If this weighting 
function were flat, that is the population density would not depend on the distance to the 
CBD, we would have     1ˆ * * * * 2i i ix x y x y  . However, it follows from the convexity 
of the bid rent curve that the housing density function  , *ig x y  is downward sloping, so that 
inequality (A16) must hold. 
If i = J(y*) and type i dwellings start in the CBD, then the additional growth in new type i 
units occurs at a density that is higher than the average for this sector. The area that would 
have been used for construction of a type with larger building height for types i < J(y*) 
consists of the most central locations in the city. Hence, density in this area is higher than 
anywhere else in this sector. The newly constructed units here can only raise the average 
density of new construction and inequality (A10) must hold a fortiori.  
For prediction 2 to be valid for the aggregate mf sector, we have to show that: 
   
 
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where  iw y  is the construction weight of type i in total mf construction: 
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Inequality (A17) may be rewritten as: 
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      
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We have shown above that    *i is y s y  for all i: the average size of apartments of all 
types decreases. The first term is therefore negative. The second term is also negative since 
Prediction 1 implies that the mf housing types closest to the CBD (which are also the types 
with the smallest floor size because of our assumption that households are indifferent to 
building height) will increase their share in total housing production in response to a positive 
income shock. The apartment types for which the weight increases are thus smaller than those 
for which the weight decreases. Since the weights must always add up to one, the changes in 




Appendix D: Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1 
AHS-survey years and included metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
 
 Survey Year Times 
surveyed MSA 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 95 96 98 02 04 
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA   x    x     x  x  4 
Atlanta, GA    x    x    x   x 4 
Baltimore, MD    x    x     x   3 
Birmingham, AL x    x    x    x   4 
Boston, MA  x    x    x   x   4 
Buffalo, NY x    x       x  x  4 
Charlotte, NC           x   x  2 
Chicago, IL    x    x        2 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN   x    x      x   3 
Cleveland, OH x    x    x   x   x 5 
Columbus, OH    x    x   x   x  4 
Dallas, TX  x    x      x  x  4 
Denver, CO   x    x    x    x 4 
Detroit, MI  x    x    x      3 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  x    x      x  x  4 
Hartford, CT    x    x    x   x 4 
Houston, TX    x    x     x   3 
Indianapolis, IN x    x    x   x   x 5 
Kansas City, MO-KS   x    x    x   x  4 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  x    x          2 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS x    x    x   x   x 5 
Miami-Hialeah, FL   x    x    x   x  4 
Milwaukee, WI x    x       x  x  4 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul  x    x    x   x   4 
New Orleans, LA   x    x    x    x 4 
New York City, NY    x    x        2 
Newark, NJ    x    x        2 
Norfolk-Newport News x    x    x    x   4 
Oakland, CA             x   1 
Oklahoma City, OK x    x    x   x   x 5 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ  x    x          2 
Phoenix, AZ  x    x      x  x  4 
Pittsburgh, PA   x    x    x    x 4 
Portland, OR   x    x    x   x  4 
Providence, RI x    x    x    x   4 
Riverside-San Bernard   x         x  x  3 
Rochester, NY   x    x      x   3 
Sacramento, CA            x   x 2 
Saint Louis, MO-IL    x    x    x   x 4 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, x    x    x    x   4 
San Antonio, TX   x    x    x    x 4 
San Diego, CA    x    x    x  x  4 
San Francisco, CA  x    x    x   x   4 
San Jose, CA x    x     x   x   4 
Seattle, WA    x        x   x 3 
Tampa-Saint Petersburg  x    x    x   x   4 
Washington, DC-MD-VA  x        x   x   3 




Base Specifications, Year-Built Dummy Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share mf Log (sq.f., sf) Log (sq.f., mf) 
Built 1980 -0.0611*** 0.0129 -0.128*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0202) (0.0425) 
Built 1981 -0.0849*** 0.0855*** -0.0270 
 (0.0177) (0.0242) (0.0548) 
Built 1982 -0.0999*** 0.0275 -0.0978 
 (0.0231) (0.0282) (0.0627) 
Built 1983 -0.144*** -0.0123 -0.0630 
 (0.0244) (0.0292) (0.0715) 
Built 1984 -0.102*** 0.0116 -0.0570 
 (0.0253) (0.0312) (0.0715) 
Built 1985 -0.108*** 0.0913** 0.0288 
 (0.0278) (0.0404) (0.0979) 
Built 1986 -0.156*** 0.144*** 0.109 
 (0.0322) (0.0450) (0.107) 
Built 1987 -0.214*** 0.164*** 0.0947 
 (0.0325) (0.0463) (0.127) 
Built 1988 -0.226*** 0.222*** 0.186 
 (0.0345) (0.0509) (0.126) 
Built 1989 -0.271*** 0.227*** 0.205 
 (0.0368) (0.0551) (0.141) 
Built 1990 -0.282*** 0.217*** 0.274 
 (0.0412) (0.0646) (0.171) 
Built 1991 -0.327*** 0.253*** 0.226 
 (0.0412) (0.0686) (0.175) 
Built 1992 -0.380*** 0.210*** 0.223 
 (0.0426) (0.0721) (0.185) 
Built 1993 -0.416*** 0.202*** 0.116 
 (0.0452) (0.0749) (0.193) 
Built 1994 -0.394*** 0.223*** 0.277 
 (0.0436) (0.0773) (0.189) 
Built 1995 -0.376*** 0.257*** 0.251 
 (0.0430) (0.0780) (0.199) 
Built 1996 -0.418*** 0.271*** 0.351 
 (0.0478) (0.0872) (0.217) 
Built 1997 -0.397*** 0.284*** 0.418* 
 (0.0509) (0.0915) (0.233) 
Built 1998 -0.408*** 0.298*** 0.429* 
 (0.0535) (0.0970) (0.254) 
Built 1999 -0.444*** 0.355*** 0.578** 
 (0.0544) (0.106) (0.263) 
Built 2000 -0.450*** 0.408*** 0.598** 
 (0.0566) (0.110) (0.273) 
Built 2001 -0.504*** 0.416*** 0.633** 
 (0.0609) (0.120) (0.295) 
Built 2002 -0.500*** 0.433*** 0.555* 
 (0.0610) (0.117) (0.287) 
Built 2003 -0.506*** 0.433*** 0.794*** 
 (0.0622) (0.121) (0.290) 
Built 2004 -0.487*** 0.486*** 0.407 
 (0.0699) (0.121) (0.297) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 
















Base Specifications but with Contemporaneous / 2-Year Lagged Explanatory Variables 
Dependent variables: Characteristics of newly built housing stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share mf 
units 
Log (unit sq.  
foot, sf) 
Log (unit sq.  
foot, mf) 
Panel A: Contemporaneous explanatory variables 
Log(Personal income per capita),  
contemporaneous 
0.659*** -0.541** -1.724*** 
(0.147) (0.263) (0.612) 
Log(Construction sector annual wage per employee), 
contemporaneous 
-0.137 0.0557 -0.0731 
(0.0988) (0.115) (0.325) 
Metro area   AHS-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year built-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.678*** 12.47*** 25.58*** 
(1.101) (2.182) (4.769) 
Observations 1829 1548 1513 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 167 167 167 
R-squared within 0.243 0.178 0.071 
  between 0.295 0.043 0.000 
  overall 0.227 0.040 0.003 
Panel B: 2-year lagged explanatory variables 
Log(Personal income per capita),  
2-year lagged 
0.536*** -0.407** -1.251** 
(0.141) (0.192) (0.511) 
Log(Construction sector annual wage per employee), 
2-year lagged 
-0.103 -0.0227 0.394 
(0.124) (0.105) (0.295) 
Metro area   AHS-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year built-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -3.788*** 11.94*** 15.82*** 
(1.044) (1.683) (4.751) 
Observations 1829 1548 1513 
Number of AHS-year x metro area combinations 167 167 167 
R-squared within 0.235 0.174 0.053 
  between 0.346 0.061 0.002 
  overall 0.253 0.052 0.003 





Base Specifications but with Shorter Window 
Dependent variables: Characteristics of newly built housing stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share mf 
units 
Log (unit sq.  
foot, sf) 
Log (unit sq.  
foot, mf) 
 10 year  
window 
5 year  
window 
5 year  
window 
5 year  
window 
Log(Personal income per capita),  
1-year lagged 
0.643*** 0.433* -0.450** -1.853*** 
(0.146) (0.234) (0.220) (0.686) 
Log(Construction sector annual wage 
per employee), 1-year lagged 
-0.0759 0.0561 -0.0110 -0.215 
(0.109) (0.157) (0.129) (0.423) 
Metro area   AHS-year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year built-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -5.182*** -4.535** 12.29*** 28.29*** 
 (1.229) (2.156) (1.941) (6.792) 
Observations 1548 973 973 949 
Number  of AHS-year x metro area 
combinations 
167 167 167 167 
R-squared within 0.204 0.159 0.165 0.067 
  between 0.160 0.101 0.038 0.000 
  overall 0.272 0.209 0.052 0.004 
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